

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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after the Geneva conference. The Chinese were apparently dissatisfied with the results of this conference because of their failure to secure membership in the United Nations and diplomatic recognition by major western powers. The Soviets believed that they were partly blamed for this failure by the Chinese. the Soviets were not particularly interested in giving China, for the time being at least, the international standing that was undoubtedly due her. The Soviets realized that China still depended on their good offices in the international field, a situation which gave Soviet diplomacy a certain influence on the conduct of China's foreign policy. the Soviets feared that China, if fully recognized internationally, might not always follow the Soviet line and might not act primarily as the protagonist of Asian interests.
2. The Soviets believed that China was bent upon becoming the leading country in Asia. It had been noted with apprehension by the Kremlin that China, which was vehemently fighting any western interference in Asia, was also very

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distrustful of all Soviet attempts to have direct influence in Asian countries. The Soviets viewed the latter development with some alarm because they feared that the regime and ideology of Communist China had not yet been consolidated sufficiently. With regard to the Chinese demand for hegemony in Asia

Soviet influence in North Korea was very limited and practically non-existent in North Vietnam. Soviet influence had also been completely eliminated in Manchuria.

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3. other points reflecting the cooling off of friendship between Moscow and Peiping, as follows:

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- a. Since the fall of 1954 Peiping has systematically removed Soviet military and economic advisers. Many of the advisers who were not desired by the Chinese were "complimented out of the country." Soviet citizens, including staff members of the Soviet diplomatic mission in Peiping, were practically prohibited from visiting specific areas, particularly the coastal area opposite Taiwan, portions of Manchuria, and North Vietnamese and Tibetan border areas.
- b. Peiping was reluctant to give the Soviets military, political, and economic data. Chinese government officials who were suspected of giving staff members of the Soviet Embassy direct information and party functionaries who enjoyed the confidence of the Soviets have been removed from office. In numerous cases, data on China's industrial production officially given to the Soviets had proved to be incorrect. The exchange of economic information was favored by the Chinese only as long as it served their own interests. Even in the field of military affairs, there was a growing Chinese tendency to get rid of direct Soviet influence at least in those sectors where the Chinese believed themselves to be self-sufficient.
- c. The gravest crisis in Soviet-Chinese relations occurred in November 1954 when Peiping, which at the time was preparing operations against Taiwan, demanded the delivery of such immense quantities of war material that compliance with the requests would have endangered the combat-readiness of the Soviet armed forces. The Chinese even requested the delivery of atomic bombs and rocket weapons.² The Soviets refused to comply with these requests; consequently the Chinese ambassador was recalled from Moscow, and China was represented in the Soviet capital by a charge d'affaires for two months.³ This development contributed to Malenkov's downfall.

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4. While Communist China was making efforts to establish closer ties with non-Communist countries in Asia in the second half of 1954, Soviet diplomats discovered that their attempts to increase Moscow's influence in these countries was meeting with distrust and reserve because of China's machinations. The Soviets therefore modified their attitude toward China approximately four weeks prior to the overthrow of Malenkov. After mid-January 1955, the USSR delivered most of the war material desired by China, including jet fighters, bombers, and small atomic bombs, but no rocket weapons. In order to be able to make these deliveries, the Soviets revised their industrial planning and shifted their main efforts to heavy industrial production. At the same time those functionaries who were responsible for the deterioration of Soviet relations with China were removed from their positions. As a result, Soviet-Chinese relations have slowly but steadily improved.

5. Soviet diplomats appear to be convinced that China is going to follow Tito's course. Semenov stated that MAO Tse-tung was a trustworthy friend of the USSR but that he was a sick man who was no longer very active in politics.

CHOU En-lai's primary political aim was not so much the spreading of Communism in Asia as the establishment of a bloc of Asian countries designed to work for the elimination of all remnants of colonialism and imperialism in Asia. the countries to be included in this bloc had an anti-western attitude, but he was not sure they would continue to have this attitude after all vestiges of western colonialism had been overcome in Asia. In this connection the example of Yugoslavia.

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Socialism in China may take on a national character. In view of this possibility the USSR must learn from the mistakes it made in Yugoslavia and try to exert as much influence as possible on the development of Chinese Communism. This attempt must be paralleled by large-scale economic, military, and political support. In order to realize such an ambitious program, the Soviets must have the situation in Europe consolidated so that they will be free from worried there.

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it was the aim of the USSR to bring about a grouping of countries in Europe that will never participate in any aggression against the eastern bloc. At a later time, the Soviets may be able to render economic support to this group of European states, which must be made as strong as possible. In this connection the possibility that the neutralized European states might export their surplus production to Asia and thus lessen the dependence of Asian countries on the United States.

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Comments

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1. Semenov, Soviet Ambassador to East Germany until July 1954, is now a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.
2. Since the Chinese Communists already had rocket launchers at this time, possibly guided missiles are meant.
3. The appointment of LIU Hsiao (0491/2556) as Chinese Ambassador to the USSR, replacing CHANG Wen-t'ien (1728/5113/1131), was announced on 13 January 1955. According to press reports, LIU arrived in Moscow on 4 February 1955 and presented his credentials on 7 February 1955.

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